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believe that the Law of Historical Memory
will have achieved some type of settlement about the past in the long term.
Nevertheless, he recognizes that given
the current climate of economic crisis
after the global financial crisis of 2008,
the issue of historical memory has lost its
urgency in Spain. While no longer front
page news, Encarnación asserts that the
Law of Historical Memory deserves credit
for creating a less contentious climate, its
symbolic importance in addressing the issue of historical memory, and for opening
a public debate about the merits of such
a law. Encarnación’s book itself offers an
engaging entry in this public debate that
posits lessons about Spain’s experience
with “democratization without justice”
that transcend the Spanish experience
and offer thoughts on political transitions
around the globe from Latin America to
post-communist countries.
William J. Nichols
Georgia State University
William J. Nichols is an Associate Professor
of Spanish Literature and Culture at Georgia
State University and Chair of the Department
of World Languages and Cultures. He is CoDirector of the Center for Urban Language
Teaching and Research a Title VI Language
Resource Center funded through the US Department of Education. Dr. Nichols is also a
member of the ADFL Executive Committee.
He published Transatlantic Mysteries: Culture,
Capital, and Crime in the “Noir” Novels of
Paco Ignacio Taibo II and Manuel Vázquez
Montalbán (Bucknell University Press, 2011)
and co-edited Toward a Cultural Archive of La
Movida (Farleigh Dickinson University Press,
2014). His essays have appeared in such
journals as the Arizona Journal of Hispanic
Cultural Studies, Revista Iberoamericana, and
Tabla Redonda. His current research focuses
on urban space, tourism, and globalization as
it is represented and explored in twentieth and
twenty-first century Spanish culture.
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Joe Renouard, Human Rights in
American Foreign Policy; From the
1960s to the Soviet Collapse (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2016), ISBN 9780812247732,
324 pages.
There are historians who do dense narrative history with great attention to documenting the details. And there are other
historians who use history to paint a big
conceptual picture whose accuracy often
leads to much debate. Joe Renouard is in
the former camp, with his new book on
human rights in US foreign policy during
the middle and late stages of the Cold
War. Samuel Moyn is in the latter camp,
with his stimulating and widely read but
controversial interpretations in The Last
Utopia: Human Rights in History.
They both agree, as do others, that
attention to human rights in US foreign
policy increased more or less around
1970. However, they differ as to why.
The subject is important and merits
extended attention. For Moyn, “The best
general explanation for the origins of
this [human rights] social movement and
common discourse around rights remains
the collapse of other, prior utopias, both
state-based and internationalist.”1 That is,
the push for international human rights is
not just idealism but actually a utopian
project, and attention to these rights took
off only after the evident failures of two
other utopian movements—communism,
and national liberation from colonialism.
There is broad agreement that after
the adoption of the UN Charter with its
path breaking reference to human rights
and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General
Assembly in 1948, not much of immedi-
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ate importance happened on the world
stage with regard to rights for some time
(except in Europe). This suggests that
political elites really did not engage in
much negative learning from the German
holocaust by making sure not to repeat
genocide and other gross violations of
human rights. They continued to prioritize traditional national interests such as
power and independence even if overlaid
with an ideological superstructure—e.g.,
anti-communism, anti-colonialism, or
anti-capitalism. In fact, President Harry
Truman did not consider the 1948 Declaration important enough to mention
in his memoirs. Moyn goes too far in
arguing that the push for human rights
circa 1970 was a totally new development, without connection to antecedent
talk about rights. However, for reasons
of space, that point will not be pursued
in depth here.
For Renouard, who cites Moyn2 but
does not directly engage with his arguments, US attention to human rights is
part of the idealistic tradition and took off
in the late 1960s because of a long list of
international and domestic factors.3 The
evident failure of communism and anticolonialism to deliver on their promises
is not among the factors he noted. There
is good reason for this, Renouard is on
the correct track, and this will be covered
later in this review.
Communism in the West was widely
considered a façade for self-serving autocratic rule long before circa 1970. Joseph
Stalin had appealed to Russian nationalism rather than international communism
during the dark days of World War II,
shutting down the Comintern. In addition, the split between Stalin and Josip
		2.
		3.
		4.
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Tito, so clear by 1948, reaffirmed the
continuing strength of some version of
nationalism even by those identifying as
communists. There are clear reasons why
former communists wrote a book with the
title The God That Failed in 1949.4 The
Soviet crushing of the Hungarian uprising
in 1956 only confirmed again what was
widely known: Russian-led communism
was less a utopian crusade based on international solidarity in pursuit of liberating
people from exploitation, and more a fig
leaf for an autocratic Russian Empire. A
defensive fear of “encirclement” by hostile Western forces may have driven the
Empire—the same fear perhaps found in
Putin’s mindset today. However, the result
of Soviet power remained an empire. It
is strange that a respected historian like
Moyn, now at Harvard, would ignore so
much historical evidence about the early
recognition of the failure of communism
in the West to deliver on its promises. For
whatever reason, he constructed a provocative but erroneous big picture. Again,
before the 1970s, the concept of “the
God that Failed” was well known and had
virtually nothing to do with the renaissance of the human rights discourse—as
further explained below. The collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991 had something
to do with expanded global action for
human rights, but not circa 1970.
With regard to communism outside
Europe, again Moyn is wrong but for a
different reason. The lure of communism
remained vibrant for some in Asia and
elsewhere after the 1970s, specifically
in China and parts of India. Also in Latin
America, communist movements in El
Salvador and Nicaragua endured into the
1980s. The appeal of communism was, in

Id. at 8.
Joe Renouard, Human Rights in American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse
6–12 (2016).
The God That Failed (Richard Crossman ed., 1972)
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fact, not over by the 1970s, undermining
Moyn’s argument. It strains credulity to
think that a leftist such as Daniel Ortega
would think: communism has failed so
now I am free to emphasize human rights.
Some non-communists in the West may
have thought this after 1991, but not
circa 1970. The Reagan Administration
(1981–1989) remained mostly fixated on
“the communist menace” especially in
Central America. In China, the ruling elite
led by Deng Xiaoping indeed turned toward more capitalist practices in the late
1970s. This shift was based on some private property rights as protected by legal
contracts, but the one party state continued to pursue short term stability through
repression and an increasingly evident
rejection of civil and political rights. In
addition, Western trading partners have
downplayed human rights violations in
China because of shared economic and
strategic interests. The Carter Administration (1977–1981) generally gave China a
pass regarding human rights violations.
The status of communism circa 1970
had little to do with renewed attention
to international human rights, whether in
Europe or beyond.
As for the anti-colonial movement,
after 1945 it was certainly a priority for
many who felt their dignity denied under
colonialism, but it did not speak to the
same set of issues as raised by the mainstream human rights discourse. These
latter issues were centered on personal
rights within states, rather than remain-
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ing quiescent until colonialism had been
undermined, and were in fact part and
parcel of many if not most anti-colonial
movement long before the 1970s. This is
clearly evident in public debates about
personal rights in the anti-colonial movement in India, and almost everywhere in
the emerging post-colonial world, before
and after 1947. Within the anti-colonial
movement, there was almost always a
debate about, and a power struggle over,
autocracy versus personal rights of various sorts as in Algeria and Kenya.5 Once
again, Moyn is off base in his reconstruction of events. Demands for national
independence from colonial rule did
not supplant and suppress human rights
debates. Rather, the two were intertwined
early on, inherently so. Moreover, the
anti-colonial movement did not fail in
its “utopian” objectives. It succeeded:
colonialism became illegitimate. What
remained was the separate set of issues
concerning personal rights in newly
independent nation-states, as evaluated
against the benchmark of international
recognized human rights.6
My own view is similar to, but not
identical with, Renouard’s in that US
foreign policy began to give greater
attention to internationally recognized
human rights circa 1970, rather than just
to “freedom” in the Cold War struggle,
for myriad, disjointed, and contingent
reasons. This is quite different from
Moyn’s view.

See Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence
in Kenya and Algeria (Dona Geyer trans., 2013).
Moyn considers the push for international human rights utopian in large part precisely
because these rights are international and not grounded in national law and courts. But
the point of international human rights is to set a standard by which to judge national
developments. The international norms are to be implemented primarily through national
processes. Only if national authorities are “unable or unwilling” to meet international
standards are international authorities supposed to control. International rights standards
do not float in some metaphysical international universe but are linked to concrete
national factors—and are negotiated primarily by national delegations in the first place.
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1) The United States as a whole was
troubled by war crimes and atrocities
so evident in the war in Southeast Asia.
After 1968, Democrats seized on this
mood to further challenge the realist
and dissembling policies of President
Richard Nixon and National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger.7 Democrats
in Congress like Representative Donald
Fraser of Minnesota found the language
of human rights useful in their critiques of
Republican realism and the downplaying
of human rights and humanitarian law by
Kissinger. This was true par excellence in
the rise of Jimmy Carter.
2) At about the same time and for
different reasons, a bargain was struck
at the UN after which the UN Human
Rights Commission began to take up
specific inquiries in a negotiated range
of countries. These inquiries included
torture by the pro-Western Greek junta;
repression in a developing country like
Haiti; occupation of Palestinian territories
by Israel; racism in apartheid South Africa; etc. Increasingly, the United States
had to take a position on these issues
within the context of the international law
of human rights and humanitarian affairs.
3) Cross cutting these factors was
the emergence of private groups like
		 7.

		8.

		9.
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Amnesty International. Starting in 1961,
mainstream media picked up the group’s
publications that stressed international
standards on civil rights.
4) Still further, the rise of moral crusaders in the Republican Party, like Barry
Goldwater and Reagan, and the early
neo-cons in the Democratic Party, like
Senator Scoop Jackson, again used the
language of human rights to attack the
Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policies of detente
with the Soviet Union. Rather than the
pursuit of stability in Great Power relations, these early neo-cons in the Democratic Party sought a crusade in the name
of victory or roll back. One result was the
Helsinki Accords and its “basket three” of
issues—and also the proliferation of other
rights groups like Helsinki Watch which
over time became Human Rights Watch.8
5) Space does not permit further
enumeration, but there were additional
reasons for increased use of the human
rights discourse in the United States
around 1970, such as the cumulative
effect of the Black civil rights movement
increasingly linking domestic concerns
to international developments and vice
versa.9
Hence, there was a cascading and
expanding discourse on internationally

Niall Ferguson’s characterization of Kissinger not as a realist but as an idealist is creative but misleading. Picturing Kissinger as committed to a life of principle in which
he endorsed pessimistic standards, to be achieved by dissembling and deception, is an
interesting form of idealism. To be skeptical about progressive developments, and hence
willing to endorse evil as the lesser evil, is hardly a conventional notion of idealism.
Right from the opening pages this book is an advocate’s brief, not a balanced biography,
even if Ferguson articulates a few minor criticisms of his subject. Niall Ferguson, Kissinger.
Volume 1, 1923–1968: The Idealist (2015).
In general, Republicans tend to utilize the discourse on human rights in relation to
“American values” whereas Democrats are slightly more inclined to mention human rights
as found in international law. Republicans like Reagan both referred to human rights and
also disparaged international law and the United Nations as foreign constructs. These
two semantic traditions, human rights as part of American values and human rights as
found in international law and organization, permit some agreement across the parties.
One sees this in the history of the human rights bureau in the State Department under
both Democratic and Republican administrations.
See Mary Louise Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: The Relationship Between Civil Rights and
Foreign Affairs in the Truman Administration (2001).
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recognized human rights in the United
States more or less around 1970, but not
for any one or two similar reasons. Not
much of this had anything to do with
waiting for the failures of communism,
and the limitations of the anti-colonial
movement, to become evident.
If Renouard has the better of the argument about the emergence of increased
attention to the human rights discourse
in Washington, one might wish that he
had manifested some of Moyn’s penchant for big picture conceptualizing.
Renouard tends to overwhelm the reader
with a mass of details. Perhaps this is
necessary when covering disparate cases
during the different decades. For Carter,
there was his special interest in Latin
America, relations with other dictators,
and the special cases of the Shah of
Iran and Afghanistan after the Soviet
invasion. For Reagan, there was the role
of anti-communist ideology, the special
case of Central America, East Asian
developments, and the big emphasis
on democracy promotion at least here
and there. But, one doubts in particular
that students will be able to synthesize
and summarize the impressive amount
of narrative history presented about the
record on human rights compiled by the
Congress plus the Carter and Reagan administrations,10 not to mention the push
for democracy abroad toward the end
of the Cold War.11 The author has read a
great deal and seems largely accurate in
his dense history. Given the amount of
material covered however, it is important
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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to be able to have thematic summaries.
Yet his conceptual framework and the
final big picture winds up being far short
of new or profound.
To the extent that Renouard has a conceptual framework for his study, it is the
traditional view that attention to human
rights abroad is liberal idealism which
creates tension with a self-interested
realism based on perceptions of national
interest.12 This traditional framing is not
new, nor does it allow one to explore
the difference between so-called neocons like George W. Bush and realists
like George H. W. Bush. Kissinger, for
what it is worth, regarded Reagan as a
liberal, not a realist.13 Renouard notes
the view, which he attributes to some
activists, that at least on some occasions
national self-interest can be blended with
attention to the rights of others.14 But just
as he did not really engage with Moyn’s
incompatible interpretations, Renouard
does not take on in any significant way
William F. Schulz’s detailed argument
that serious attention to human rights
is often very much in the United States
self-interest in the long run.15 Even if one
agrees with Schulz’s argument, there still
remains the question of how to get from
here to there. Supporting Abdel al-Sisi’s
repression in Egypt no doubt guarantees
future problems and eventual explosions
of discontent. But should policymakers
in Washington push for the uncertain
quest for stable democracy in the future,
when in the short term there is pressure
to link up with a reliable if repressive ally

Renouard, supra note 3, ch. 2–4.
Id. ch. 5.
Id. at 6.
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 763, 771 (1994) (use of only the liberal-realist distinction
makes it very difficult to accurately portray figures such as Ronald Reagan and George
W. Bush).
Renouard, supra note 3, at 18.
William F. Schulz, In Our Own Best Interest: How Defending Human Rights Benefits us All
(2001).
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in a troubled and violent region posing
dangers to the United States homeland?
The best that the author can do by way
of conclusion is to argue that Washington has had a mixed record in wrestling
with the tensions between liberalism and
realism in foreign policy. He argues that
“consistency is an impossible standard,”16
and notes “the selectivity of policies and
rhetoric.”17 Reinhold Niebuhr concluded
something similar decades ago, as far
back as the 1930s, when he argued that
attempts to advance morality or justice
in the state system of world affairs always
led to a mixed picture with unsatisfying
compromises. Renouard’s ultimate conclusion is that the basic liberal-realist
tension will continue. He writes that

16.
17.
18.

Renouard, supra note 3, at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 279.
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given nationalism and the commitment to
national interest, “it remains to be seen”
just what role attention to human rights
will play in future US foreign policy.18
This is definitely not a new and provocative argument, even if his coverage of
foreign policy details is largely accurate
and impressive.
David P. Forsythe
Professor Emeritus
David P. Forsythe is the Charles J. Mach
Distinguished Professor, Emeritus, of Political
Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
He taught human rights there for almost forty
years where one now finds the Forsythe Family
Program on Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs.

